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Article 15

Informed Consent
Dennis J. Horan and Patrick Halligan

Portions of this paper repeat and otherwise rely heavily on Mr.
Horan's (1975 and revised 1976) article "Authority for Medical Treatment: Consent" in Medical Malpractice, a handbook published by the
Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 2395 W. Jefferson
Blvd., Springfield, Illinois and reproduced here with their permission.

Introduction
There occur disputes between physicians and their patients in
which an attempted cure not only does not succeed but also aggravates the condition of ill-being of the patient despite skillful implementation of the technique or method of cure. The aggravation
usually surprises the patient in a bitter way. The aggravation is called a
side effect or collateral effect. The bitterness of the surprise sometimes creates a complaint that the physician knew the side effect was
possible and did not tell the patient. The plaintiff then suggests that
he would or might not have taken the cure had he been informed of
the possible side effect and so would, incidentally, not have suffered
the "injury." These disappointments crystallize in the allegation that
the physician did not obtain informed consent to the cure. Provisionally then, lack of informed consent is a doctrine about liability for
side effects of touching by a physician which happen despite manual
skill.
Consent for treatment has always been recognized by medical
practitioners as an essential element in their relationship to the patient
and a necessary requirement conditioning the imposition of hands
for purposes of healing. With this the law agreed , a lack of authorization to any touching having rightfully been considered a battery [Pratt
v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300,79 N.E. 562 (1906)].
In its early days, medicine was much more paternalistic than it is
now. As a consequence, consent was more readily assumed or, more
correctly, less readily denied under the concept of "doctor knows
best." The doctrine of informed consent had its genesis in certain
early 20th century battery cases, but really began in 1957 with the
case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154
Cal. app. 2d 560, 317 P2d 170 (1957) .
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In recent years the law has focused on the quality of the consent.
Where the consent was given, but knowledge of the collateral risks
withheld , the consent is said to be vitiated because not informed.
Thus, there has arisen a new cause of action generally called a lack of
informed c;onsent [79 A.L.R. 2d 1028].
Whether this new cause of action sounds in battery or negligence
has been debated, and the debate has not been entirely settled to this
date. A majority of the courts has decided that the action is one of
negligence and expert testimony is necessary [52 A.L.R. 3d 1084].
However, a distinct and strong minority maintains that the action can
be either negligence or battery and that oftentimes expert testimony,
although necessary for certain aspects of the case, may not be necessary on the issue of whether or not the consent is informed [Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,791 (D.C . Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229,502 P 2d 1 (1972)] . Each of these issues will be discussed
in detail hereafter.
A majority of the courts has concluded that the doctrine of
informed consent creates a cause of action in professional negligence
against a physician when, although there may be on the surface no
negligence in the treatment, (1) there is a collateral side effect to
treatment (common knowledge risks such as infection excluded) or, as
it is commonly called, a "bad result"; and (2) the physician failed to
properly warn the patient of that possibility when securing the consent; and (3) the physician failed to advise the patient of alternative
modes of treatment, if any [Louisell and Williams, Medical Malpractice (Matthew Bender, 1974), Ch. 22, pp. 594.43-594.64; Waltz and
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw.U.L. Rev. 628
(1970)] .
Hospitals

,\

Whether and to what extent the doctrine is applicable to a hospital
as distinct from a physician is not at all clear at the present time.
Normally hospital personnel perform an administrative function by 0 btaining the signature of a patient to a consent form, whereas the discussion of the medical or operative procedure is done by the staff physician
or surgeon. Consequently, hospitals are usually not involved in informed
consent cases unless the hospital employees, such as an employed
(not an independent contractor) radiologist or pathologist is involved
in obtaining the consent or giving the treatment. See, e.g., Ze Barth v.
Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P2d 1, 52
A.L.R. 3d 1067 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1972); Stivers v. George Washington
Univ. 320 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see dicta in Fiorentino v.
Wenger 19 N.Y.2d 407,418,227 N.E.2d 296, 301280 N.Y.S. 2d 373,
381 (1967) and Ohligschlager v. Proctor Memorial Hospital 6 III App.
2d 81.
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Battery
The law treats actions against physicians where consent has not
been obtained prior to treatment as batteries. Three such cases are
illustrative. From these cases eventually arose the doctrine of lack of
informed consent or as we shall refer to it hereafter, informed consent. Much confusion exists about the nature of this cause of action
and its essential elements. Some historical analysis is necessary in
order to avoid the confusion and clarify the necessary elements of an
informed consent case.
The most influential decision appears to be Mohr v. Williams, 95
Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) . In Mohr, the plaintiff consented to
an operation on the right ear. At surgery, the defendant physician
determined that the culprit was really the left ear and so operated on
it instead. The trial court award plaintiff damages for the unauthorized operation and the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, rejecting the defense arguments that (1) no consent was necessary since the
surgery was necessary and beneficial to the plaintiff; (2) there was no
intent to harm; and (3) consent can be inferred. Citing the lower court
Pratt opinion, infra, the Mohr court spoke of every citizen's first and
greatest right, which underlies all others - "the right to the inviolability of his person," which no surgeon, no matter how eminent or
skillful, may violate without consent.
In Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906), the defendant
physician performed two operations on the plaintiff, ultimately
removing her uterus and ovaries. The court found that neither the
woman nor her husband had consented to the operation and affirmed
an award of compensatory and exemplary damages. The defense
arguments were substantially similar to those in Mohr. Rejecting these,
the Pratt court concluded that absent an emergency, "consent should
be a prerequisite to a surgical operation" [224 Ill. 300,305].
Pratt v. Davis was followed by the Oklahoma case of Rolater v.
Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1913) (unauthorized removal of
bone in foot), and both were followed by the case which contains the
classic statement on this issue. In Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (Ct. Appl. N.Y. 1914),
Justice Cardozo in affirming a judgment against the defendant
physician for unauthorized surgery said:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages.

Each of these courts spoke of the novelty of the issue and each
followed the lead of the Illinois Appellate Court in Pratt. They used
traditional tort analysis relying on horn book law involving unauthorized touching which constitutes a battery. The defenses were posed
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and argued on that basis, offering implied consent or privilege to
touch or no intent to harm as vitiating factors. The notion of implied
consent is a notion of actual consent implied in fact. It differs greatly
from informed consent.
The Initiation of the New Tort
of Lack of Informed Consent
The next phase of the informed consent confusion began in 1957
with the statements made by the court in the now famous case of
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) .
In Salgo, the court defined the physician 's duty to his patient as
such that he violates the duty" ... if he withholds any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to
the proposed treatment." This definition constituted a substantial
change in the law since, unlike the cases discussed previously, it
assumed that actual consent to touch was given, but concentrated on
the facts surrounding the consent to determine whether or not the
consent was knowingly given. Salgo involved an aortograph procedure
which resulted in paralysis. The complaint sounded in negligence and
the court instructed on negligence. Although not altogether clear, the
doctrine of informed consent seemed not to be a theory of battery,
but the court did not attempt to abrogate prior decisions that where
no consent was given a battery was committed. That is, the court
initiated a new tort whose remedies cumulate with older forms and
did not abolish technical battery.
One obvious difference between the battery theory and the Salgo
theory is the necessity for expert testimony. Where no consent whatever is given, the case becomes a traditional battery case. If a battery
analysis is used, the case may go to the jury on the testimony of the
plaintiff alone, without testimony concerning the standard of care in
the medical community. In addition, the applicable statutes of limitations may vary greatly in some jurisdictions, as do the insurance
problems. Is the Salgo theory a negligence theory or a constructive
deceit model or is it sui generis?
A Kansas opinion in 1960 highlighted the difficulties in understanding this new cause of action. Nathanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350
P.2d 1093, reh. denied, 187 Kan . 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). Ultimately, the Kansas court decided that the action sounded in negligence.
The court of appeals of Arizona in 1965 discussed the issue
referring to the continuing confusion between negligence and battery
and concluded that the action lies in either. The court's summarizing
statement is a classic of the confusion the courts have faced in
analyzing this hybrid cause of action (409 P .2d p . 86) :
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Summarizing, we hold that a consent to a surgical procedure is effected if
the consenter understands substantially the nature of the surgical procedure
attempted and the probable results of the operation. This, as a matter of
law, constitutes an informed consent. Lacking this, the operation is a
battery unless some special exception pertains. Given an informed consent,
liability, if any, must be predicated in malpractice. In malpractice, the duty
of the physician to disclose is determined by the normal practices of his
profession in the particular community. We do not attempt to determine
the law in the case of particularly dangerous operations, when some courts
have ruled as a matter of law that disclosure must be made. Nathanson u.
Kline, supra, and Mitchell u. Robinson, supra. If it is found that the
standard of disclosure has been breached in the particular case, and if injury
has resulted therefrom, then there is liability in malpractice. Whether there
was sufficient evidence in this case, arising from the testimony of the
defendant-doctor or otherwise, to go to the jury on the question of whether
the defendant-doctor breached a duty to disclose we need not decide
because there is no showing here that the failure to disclose resulted in the
plaintiff's unfortunate condition.

Negligence or Malpractice
The earliest statement of the cause of action in its present form in
other than an American jurisdiction occurred in a Canadian case. In
Kenny v. Lockwood, 1932, Onto Rptr_ 141, the court stated that in
the matter of providing or not providing information, it is the obligation of a physician to "exercise skill" in giving and withholding advice.
The relationship which creates the obligation, i.e., the source of duty,
is the relation of patient and physician. The court rejected the characterization of the relationship as that of a fiduciary and confiding
person and thoroughly rejected any preconceived policy favoring full
disclosure_ The source of the standard of disclosure is the medical
profession_ The members of the profession must conform to the standards of the profession but need not give more or less information
than competent physicians give_ A plaintiff in Ontario must prove
these standards by expert testimony_ Physicians sometimes have a
privilege to conceal information in order to induce the patient to take
a course of treatment he might otherwise refuse.
This "privilege" is not an unmitigated boon to medical doctors_
Where the obligation is to use skill in disclosing and withholding
information, there may be liability not only for some reservations of
information but also for disclosure which creates emotional or other
harm [Menehan V. Williams, 379 P. 2d 292 at 294]. See also, Ferrara V.
Gallucio, 152 N.E. 2d 249, a 1958 New York case.
The privilege found by the court in Kenny is not merely a defense
or justification which the defense may assert affirmatively. RatJ:ler, the
absence of the therapeutic reason or custom must be proved by plaintiff. The privilege is not, to use traditional pleading terms, a bar but a
no-claim rule, absence of the therapeutic rationale being an element of
the plaintiff's proof.
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As is illustrated in the case discussion hereafter, most American
courts have maintained that the cause of action for informed consent
sounds in negligence. For example, an analysis of one jurisdiction
which has accepted the negligence or malpractice model would be
appropriate at this time to illustrate the many unanswered questions
that still remain, even after that threshold is crossed.
In Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E. 2d 156 (1970),
the court ruled that because the lack of informed consent problem
allegedly involved concerned matters which were not of common
knowledge or within the experience of laymen, that expert testimony
was just as necessary as in any other medical malpractice case. The
court affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the defendant at the
close of the plaintiffs case because the plaintiff did not present expert
testimony on the standard of care with regard to obtaining consents in
the community.
The Green case involved a post-operation series of cobalt and x-ray
treatments on the plaintiff which, it is alleged, damaged her severely.
She alleged that although she had given consent for a biopsy and
mastectomy, no consent either written or oral or implied had been
obtained for the radiation therapy. In addition, she had not been
advised of the collateral risks involved in x-ray and cobalt therapy.
Mrs. Green denied any consent to the radiation therapy. On the
basis of that testimony, some courts would allow the case to go to the
jury on a battery theory. However, the inappropriateness of this is
easily seen when one considers that some form of consent had to be
implied or Mrs. Green would not have taken the successive cobalt
treatments. She obviously was not forced under a machine to receive
the treatment. Consequently, analyzing the case as one involving a
lack of informed consent is more appropriate under the circumstances.
Since there was no expert evidence of what the reasonable physician
in the same community, under similar circumstances, would disclose
regarding the risks and hazards of radiation therapy, the court
affirmed the directed verdict.
More importantly, but almost unnoticed in the opinion, is the issue
of proximate cause on which the court also indicated that there was
an absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. Proximate cause is an
extremely important issue in a lack of informed consent case. It
requires that the plaintiff prove that she would not have undergone
the treatment if she had known of the collateral risk. The weight of
authority seems to indicate that such a test should be an objective one
as is the prudent man test, which leaves the issue to be determined by
the jury rather than a subjective test relying solely upon her testimony
[Holstrom, Informed Consent: Alternatives, 1973 U. Ill. L.F.
739-756]. In any event, her testimony to that effect becomes an essential part of the cause of action.
November, 1982

363

The Green case teaches that Illinois accepts the majority position
requiring expert testimony in informed consent cases. However, other
issues remain unresolved. It is possible under some circumstances to
avoid the necessity of expert testimony. If so, what might the circumstances be? What is the appropriate standard for proximate cause, the
objective or subjective test? See note: Informed Consent -A Proposed
Standard for Medical Disclosure, N.Y.U .L.Rev. 548-563 (1973). What
are the defenses to such an action? What is the materiality of the risk
that must be disclosed? What are the damages allowable in such an
action? For example, if the operation is performed with all due care,
but a collateral risk not entirely unexpected results and the risk was
not disclosed, should the physician be liable for all of the damages
involved in the risk? Since the cause of action involved the subjective
knowledge of the plaintiff, what is the applicable statute of limitations?
If Illinois or, for that matter, any state had analyzed the informed
consent tort on a negligence theory and answered all of the
unanswered questions the tort would resemble the following:
1. There must first exist the relationship of physician and patient
for the purpose of rendering and receiving treatment. Out of this
relationship the duty to disclose arises.
2. The physician must recommend to the patient a certain form of
treatment about which he knows the existence of certain risks
which occur in a statistically determinable number of cases without reference to due care.
3. The known risk must be a material one which means that it is not
trivial nor one such as infection which may be an incidence of all
procedures.
4. The physician must inadvertently neglect to tell the patient about
the collateral risk. He can do so by either neglecting to say anything at all or by giving too little information or incorrect information. In any event, the patient has not received adequate
enough information about the risk to capably assess the problems he may incur if he opts for this treatment.
5. Divulging the particular risk must be in accordance with community medical standards. That is, the standard in this medical
community is that the particular risk is ordinarily revealed to the
pati~nt.

6. There must be no emergency situation since an emergency will
excuse the necessity for consent, the law presuming that in such
circumstances the patient would have consented.
7. There exists an alternative treatment which would have avoided
the risk. If the physician reveals the risk but not the alternative
treatment, an action in lack of informed consent could still lie.
Consequently both the risk and the alternative treatment must be
revealed and discussed.
364
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8. However, even if no alternative treatment existed, the risk must
still be revealed or an action may lie. This is so since the physician's duty requires obtaining consent and the patient has the
option to refuse all or any treatment. This last point may seem to
confuse the application of the medical community standard, but
nonetheless, it remains true and is the source of much of the
confusion in the conflicting opinions which are discussed hereafter. Consumer-oriented courts which consider this action to be
one in the nature of misrepresentation or deceit see the creation
of the applicable standard of care arising from the point of view
of the patient who is the consumer of the service. They begin
with the premise that the patient has an absolute right to know
the nature and risks of the treatment. This type of analysis leads
to a great deal of confusion since it deals with tort concepts in
absolutes. If correct, it would mean that medical judgment would
never be a consideration. No court has gone that far. To do so
would seem to be unreasonable. However, these consumeroriented attitudes playa great part in close cases in determining
whether expert testimony is necessary. Obviously, a balancing of
these competing interests is the only appropriate way to handle
the problem. Revelation of the risk is preferred but medical
judgment cannot be left out of the problem. Medical community
standards should control. The standard of revelation should be
the standards ordinarily followed by the medical community. In
rare instances and where necessary, courts and legislatures can
impose reasonable standards on the medical community.
9. Expert testimony is required to prove:
A. the incidence and thus the materiality of the risk;
B. the medical standard of revelation in the community;
C. the deviation from the standard by the hypothetical physician
in this case;
D. the nature of the injury received by the existence of the risk
and its causal connection to the procedure;
E. the available alternative treatment, if any.
10. The plaintiff may testify that he would have rejected the treatment or selected another treatment if informed of the risk but
such testimony is not binding on the court and jury even if not
contradicted. This is the so-called subjective standard of proof.
11. The jury decides the case based on an objective standard of a
prudent man. The jury determines what an ordinarily prudent
patient would have done under similar circumstances. The conduct of that prudent person under the circumstances revealed by
the testimony, including the expert testimony, becomes the
norm by which the trier of fact assesses fault. The jury must
decide that, but for the lack of knowledge, the patient would
have foregone the risk.
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12. The physician can affirmatively prove that, for this particular
patient, revelation of the risk was contra-indicated. This may be a
defense even if the standard is violated, but it should be considered only an affirmative defense, the weight of which is left to
the trier of fact. There are two ways of speaking of therapeutic
privilege. In the broad sense it means a physician's privilege to
withhold the type of information which all physicians in the
community withhold. In its narrow sense, it refers to the exercise
of that physician's medical judgment in this particular case. The
courts use the expression in both these senses.
13. Damages should be the monetary measure of the difference
between the patient's condition with no treatment and his condition after the undisclosed risk materialized.
14. Punitive damages should not ordinarily be allowed.
15. The burden of proof of nondisclosure rests with the plaintiff.
The burden of proof of deviation from the community standard
rests with the plaintiff. The burden of justification rests with the
physicians. That burden can be established if the physician can
show that the patient told him that he did not want to be
informed, or that the procedure was simple and the danger
remote and commonly appreciated to be remote, or that the
disclosure would have seriously upset the patient's health, or that
something less than full disclosure was warranted under the circumstances of the case.
Defenses
Whether the action is treated as one sounding in battery or negligence makes an important difference in what defenses are available.
The traditional defenses to a battery suit are privilege, consent,
implied consent, self defense, apparent necessity, and use of reasonable force.
As explained by the court in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502
P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972) in referring to the defenses to
a negligence action:
Whenever appropriate the court should instruct the jury on the defenses
available to a doctor who has failed to make the disclosure required by law.
Thus, a medical doctor need not make disclosure risks when the patient
requests that he not be so informed . ... Such a disclosure need not be made
if the procedure is simple and the danger remote and commonly appreciated
to be remote. A disclosure need not be made beyond that required within
the medical community when a doctor can prove by preponderance of the
evidence he relied upon facts which would demonstrate to a reasonable man
the disclosure would have so seriously upset the patient that the patient
would not have been able to dispassionately waive the. risks of refusing to
undergo the recommended treatment.

Additional defenses as outlined in Canterbury v. Spence talk in
terms of the physician's privilege not to disclose. The first involves an
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unconscious patient or one incapable of consenting where treatment is
immediately necessary. This is usually described as the emergency
exception. The second involves the situation where the risk disclosure
poses a threat to the well-being of the patient. However, the burden is
always on the doctor to satisfy the jury that something less than
revelation was good medicine.
Proximate causation or causal connection is another extremely
important defense. This defense exists when, but only when, disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would not have
resulted in a decision against the treatment.
Another defense is that the medical community standard has not
been violated.
When Is a Risk Material?

,

To establish a breach of duty on the part of the physician, plaintiff's counsel must show that there existed a duty to disclose and there
was not adequate information given by the physician to fulfill that
duty. What constitutes adequate or sufficient information under these
circumstances is extremely difficult to say. The courts have created
numerous roles indicating, generally speaking, that the information
must relate sufficient knowledge of the materiality of the risk involved
so that the patient can make a knowledgeable judgment as to the
alternative treatment or rejection of treatment.
There must first exist knowledge on the part of the physician that a
risk is involved. If he did not have such knowledge, then an additional
question can be involved: namely, whether or not he should have had
such knowledge. The standard on that question is the normal standard
in the community as in any malpractice case.
There must be a duty to disclose the risk, which obviously means
that the patient involved must be the one capable of giving the consent, so that we must be talking about an adult patient of sound mind.
The duty to disclose must exist in the light of the medical condition
of the patient so that the disclosure does not harm the patient. Where
this would be the case, then there obviously would be no duty to
disclose. So, too, in risks that are commonly known to occur, no duty
exists. For example, there is no duty on the part of a physician to
reveal that an infection can be possible as a result of a particular
operation , even though infection does occur in perhaps two to three
percent of such cases.
The disclosure must be of a material risk, that is a risk which, if
known to the patient, would have deterred the patient from undergoing the treatment. Obviously this is a very difficult medical question
which must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and no general rule can
be stated other than that the physician should be careful and use good
medical judgment in deciding what risks he should reveal. In this age
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of defensive medicine because of medical malpractice suits, the
propensity is to over-reveal the risks rather than under-reveal. Perhaps
this is better, and in the long run will prove more beneficial to the
practice of medicine.
The risk, if revealed, must be one that would deter {he patient from
the procedure. This means that the patient would have rejected the
treatment altogether if he knew of the risk. To even state that proposi·
tion is to show how absurd it can be in practical application. The issue
of lack of informed consent would not even arise if there had not been
an untoward result. Under those circumstances hindsight dictates that
the patient would subjectively conclude that he would not have undertaken the treatment if he knew what he was going to suffer. For this
reason the courts have rejected a subjective test and have supplanted it
with an objective test.
In Cobbs u. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P. 2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972), the California Supreme Court opted for the objective test,
saying this:
The patient-plaintiff may testify on this subject, but the issue extends
beyond his credibility. Since at the time of the trial the uncommunicated
hazard has materialized, it will be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not
claim that he had been informed of the dangers he would have d eclined
treatment. Subjectively he may believe so, with the 20{20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that justice will be served by placing the physicia n in
jeopardy of the patient's bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective
test is preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient's position
have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils.

Another case that has discussed the standard is Canterbury u.
Spence, 464 F. 2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Canterbury court is in a
very distinct minority since its approach to informed consent is that
the standard is oftentimes a non-medical judgment and, if so, does not
require the specialized treatment under the law which necessitates
expert testimony. The Canterbury court says that "all risks potentially
affecting the decision must be unmasked." The law sets the standard,
and "if, but only if, the fact finder can say that the physician's communication was unreasonably inadequate is an imposition of liability
legally or morally justified."
The Canterbury court found:
The scope of the standard is not subjective as to either the physician or the
patient; it remains objective with due regard for the patient's informational
needs and with suitable leeway for the physician's situation.

In what could almost be an instruction on this issue the Canterbury
court, in quoting from Waltz and Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 639·40 (1970), stated:
A risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not
to forego the proposed therapy.
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In determining the nature of the informed consent cause of action
in any jurisdiction, resort must first be had to the common law cases.
Thereafter the statute should be reviewed to determine its effect on
the nature of the action.
When we sp~ak of a misrepresentation or consumer model, we refer
to the fact that certain jurisdictions see the origin of the applicable
standard of revelation to exist as a right of the consuming public to
know, rather than as a duty upon the physician to reveal, determined
by medical community standards. Subjective reliance refers to the
state of mind of the plaintiff, the issue whether and, i.f so, to what
extent the court will entertain the plaintiff's self-serving testimony on
this point.
By objective materiality we mean the objective test or standard of
the prudent patient acting under similar circumstances which is the
objective standard to be applied by the jury.

Doctors' Meditation
Albert S. Axelrad
May I remain ever mindful of the high ideals to which I chose
to dedicate my life through the practice of medicine. As my
effectiveness impinges on the life and death of my patients, let
me retain alertness and competence, while remaining current in
my field. In the face of abundant pressures, let me apportion
my time and give of myself wisely. As I treat people with
serious illness, may I remember always that my patients are
persons and not merely cases, that they are human beings with
feelings and not only diseased organisms. Let me treat their
maladies with proficiency and them with empathy and compassion, sensitivity and understanding, remembering how frightening and disorienting are sickness and surgery. Let me be sensitive to my patients' anxiety over tests and hospitals. May my
doctoring represent the noblest of combinations - medical
excellence and human kindness.
Rabbi Albert S. Axelrad is the chaplain and Hillel director at Brandeis
University, Waltham, Mass. In recent years, he has become considerably
involved in medically related issues, e.g., the hospice movement.
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